Emas Installation At Mangalore Airport Engineering Essay

Emas Inst twaination At Mangalore airdrome engine room EssayYP- Eurocontrol Support whatsoever engineering device which helps to mitigate risks associated with course each(prenominal) overflow (Page, 2010). Every proposal that is made to ICAO depart be consulted with all member states, where each member state has a role to get in consultation and coordination of both changes with Annex 14. unless, drome panel collects decides on any am closing curtainments.DH- The main difficulty involved in set up EMAS is non the factual equal of episode, in fact is the question of who funds the actual job?(Quan, 2010). This issue is dealt differently by FAA administer the funding of installments where ratified effective by means of Airport Improvement Programme (AIP). AIP is a architectural plan which provides grant to airdrome operators including private operators to improve their aerodromes natural rubber and efficiency (FAA, 2010b). The money is increase through taxe s on airplane ticket sold to public and taxes on air power fuel. In contrary, legion(predicate) European airports feature a privatised nature of ownership and since on that point is no government funding relievering EMAS. Consequently, it leave behind be purely a commercial business closing for airport a hardlyhorities whether to implement an EMAS or ext hold back their RESA (Eurocontrol, 2010).YP FAA has a legal tariff to implement golosh standards in all US airports in foothold of sentry go regulation as it is both regulator and navigation dish provider and in around subject areas airport operator which enables it to cover totally air traffic management. FAA is non the aircraft operator only if it regulates the aircraft operators. In contrary, some airports external US find it extremely difficult to decide whether to commit in a several one thousand million dollars structure which might be never utilize or instead fit out in course quality improveme nts and also focusing on stabilise onrushes which they seem to be more effective in encumbering path overrun in the archetypal place (Eurocontrol). soon EMAS installation indoors RESA is a fragmented scenario particular(prenominal)ly in Europe at one time the entire eventualities argon covered (CAA, 2010b). heretofore various aviation motiveities atomic number 18 supportive with the idea if besstor cans as an effective and efficient mitigator (CAA, 2010b Eurocontrol, 2010b). Moreover EMAS should be taken into consideration in light of another(prenominal) preventative methods.CAA Currently CAA is assisting ICAO with memorise foc calld on the touch- raft lights particularly for the aerodromes with steep salutees as well as short cartroads. thither bequeath be a proposal to implement a strike off of lights as it is afoot(predicate)ly get hold ofed by London City Airport aiming to assist operating crew to initiate a go-around in eccentric persons where pilots f ail to land within the appropriate touch-down zone (CAA, 2010b). CAA (2010b) suggest that they be contribute to fire rubber eraser rims through a different approach which is to identify risks and matchly implement preventative measures than investing financially into a infrastructure. stock- lock a member of CAA aerodrome sentry duty points out that well-be postulated aviation authorities in many European countries are gradually following the footsteps of FAA with regards to promoting gumshoe equipments and procedures. They are starting to introduce themselves not save as a regulator with regards to raceway rubber which conducts regular aerodromes auditing silence they are initiating to acknowledge and encourage any safety device enhancement within aerodromes. It may be true that they do not be possessed of the figure like FAA to support safety suggests yet they are offering consultations on variety of options available for each airport to consider which they m ight be unaware of much(prenominal) solutions, aiming to maximise margins of hallucination.CAA CAA has always proposed and supported the 240m should be the ICAO standard. lag the idea of EMAS has been part of the recent upset as CAA are currently putt a paper together to propose it to ICAO in October 2010 which they rely it passed through panels and eventually to the Air Navigation Council (ANC) and by the time it reaches this point, it will be mature document with all different agreements from all parties, just the gestation period for these types of processes may take up to 5 years. This is of the sum of money(p) to focus and study the procedures followed by ICAO before making any improvements to annexes, as they operate on the basis of consensus and it ecumenicly takes a dour time to collects agreements from around if not all member states.CAA fit to a rails safety advisor at CAA, who worked with many airports has identied that the c at a timept of capital outlay in any aerodrome being orotund, medium or low-down was revolved around balancing acts between a varieties of competing needs. Moreover, in some airports where at that place are deficiencies in their RESA, it is still the responsibility of board not the CAA to make the decision which in virtually cases is the commercial business decision. Unfortunately, on that point is a deficiency within the current brass that suggests at some airports due to lack of financial profitability of some safety projects, the proposed safety enhancement will be compromised with economical issues.YP In case of UK CAA enforcing 240m RESA as a emergency for all UK airports regardless of their size just like FAA might be significantly effective in maximising safety margins yet the social cost of such enforcement on society would be blasting, then, it is apparent that it is unlikely to happen due to its unfavourable nature.YP However this is the ranch where IATAs adopted policy of implementing rule s could lead on ICAO towards pick take aim of compliance. Moreover it is possible that in near future IATA could be setting up an implementing rule which states with regards to annex 14 RESAs, the alternative means of compliance to the current requirement is an approved arrestor strike out (CAA, 2010b).YP in that location is currently a debate whether aerodromes should declare mapping and charting RESA or EMAS in aeronautical notification publications. This has been raised on the basis of risk compensation where ext obliterateing RESA is suggested to make pilots less button-down during landing once they know that they shake up extra space for landing. In contrast, IFALPA (2008) states extra RESA would be effective as it would provide extra braking cleverness for operating crew as excursion adventures rate has not ameliorate for the past 20 years (Eurocontrol, 2010).CAA- Proposals for the inclusion of information closely arrestor system will be considered by ICAO in Octobe r (CAA, 2010). accord to CAA there are currently some airports in UK that are considering to adopt an EMAS at their RESA.EMAS Kevin KQKQ Currently Zodiac Aerospace is working with ICAO in order to get their support, recognition and citation of EMAS as an effective product and according to Quan (2010) there will be hopefully an am checkment to annex 14 by declination 2010, which would state that ICAO recognise and accept the product as an option for airport to adopt their RESA requirements. Once the approval is made, other countries aviation authorities will be more good about the product particularly after the ICAO requirements has been met.KQ Cost of an EMAS will face on location and the design aircraft type for which the arrestor set out sex will be installed for, however, a project in US is less expensive than other countries due to the transportation cost such as shipping. According to Quan an EMAS project in US could be between 3-10 million US dollars.KQ thus far t hough EMAS has been funded and approved by FAA but every US airport before installation must consider other alternatives such as use of declared distance which reassigns some part of course as a RESA. This option would authorizedly introduce operational limitations and also shorter track promotes lower utility from the airfield. However the FAA requirement is 300m RESA which is still recommendation by ICAO. As there are many airports in US which are limited to meet the FAA RESA requirement, which encourages them to adopt other alternatives such as putting as much EMAS bed as possible in their RSA to enhance their safety margins (Quan, 2010). According to ESCO (2010), the smallest EMAS bed installed in US is about 50m duration and 30m width.KQ As FAA essentially encourages airports to endeavour and position highest practical limit of safety (Heald, 2010). According to consultative Circle 5200.9 (FAA, 2005) every airport aiming to meet the requirement must do a 20 years life v ibration values to establish the cost of install an EMAS on each end of runway and furthermore the airport is then permitted to spend up to the reckon cost value from AIP budget to improve safety.KQ In case of Madrid, the EMAS was not deployed to meet the ICAO recommended fare, as the runway had already 240m of RESA beyond the runway break apart. However Madrids airport agency decided to deploy EMAS on two farm animal of latitude runways due to the operational concerns involved. They two sets of parallel runways, one set are used for landing and the other is used for takeoff.KQ additionally, the landing runway has a safety electron orbit which intercepts to safety area of another runway, in essence, there were two safety areas occupying the same space. Their concern was in case of an overrun in landing runway and the aircraft ends up in the safety area that a portion of which intersects the departure runway safety area. Consequently both runways would be closed, therefore , they decided to deploy EMAS within the safety area to prevent the overrunning aircraft from set downing the other RESA.KQ Based on study conducted by ESCO (2010), the EMAS bed is most appropriate at airports with geographical and physical limitations which constrain them to meet the ICAOs requirement. For instance, a 400ft of EMAS bed is as effective as 1000ft RESA in chit B737 travelling pass the end of runway with speed of 70knot. Considering the reduction in foot print requirement is promotes EMAS as an ideal solution for many airports worldwide.KQ -EMAS bed is establish on a modular system, therefore, during an overrun entirely the sections that are used to sink the tyres and stop the aircraft need to be repaired. According to Quan (2010) an estimate price for each block in US market is roughly around 1200 US dollars. Moreover according to FSF (2006), repair of the arrestor bed that brought the 747 at John F. Kennedy foreign Airport to rest in December 2005 cost about U S$2 million dollars, as it stands to the most costly repair known to ESCO.The most recent EMAS arrestment was outlined by KQ, which was a Bombardier CRJ-200 operated by a regional Jet at Charleston, westerly Virginia. The aircraft entered an EMAS bed that comprised of 4200 blocks and it brought the aircraft to stop safely, saving over 34 people and only consumed 170 blocks where there is a steep 446ft beyond the EMAS bed (EMAS, 2010). In case of any overrun, the operator of the aircraft is liable for the repair of the airport spot as the aircraft has ended up at a point which is technically not suppose to enter. Typically the insurer of the aircraft operator pays for repair of any damage to airport property.EMAS David DHDH EMAS beds implementation in both China and Spain were conducted according to FAAs policy. However, once ICAO recognise EMAS as suitable alternative to standard recommended RESA, ICAO jell will not make any reference to FAA policies.DH In essence FAA considers an EMAS adapted of decelerating range of aircrafts on a runway at 70 knots, based on the study conducted by FAA that found that 90 portion of aircraft depart the end of runway at 70knot or less. Furthermore, FAA approves such systems analogous to 305m safety area in US. According to Zodiac Aerospace (2010) every EMAS installation was funded through AIP. However the final exhibit for any airport upon the acceptance of an EMAS as an effective substitute to RESA that aims to meet the ICAOs requirements is based on financial calculations. The most financial feasible option for airport usually will be chosen, whether it is to install an EMAS, shift or shorten the runway to meet the requirements (Heald, 2010).DH Additionally if there is a situation where there are physical constraints that are not practical to remove such as highways, railways and any topographical features that would cause the cost to be so high as to close out that area, an EMAS becomes an appropriate choice. Ac cording to ESCO (2008), airports also tend to deploy EMAS where there affirm been environmental concerns associated with expansion of RESA such as physical cost of acquisition.DH As it was pointed out by DH, China was the starting line country to adopt EMAS outside US, using it to maximise its runway safety margins at high-altitude airport in Jiuzhaigou (FSF, 2006).DH One of the most critical advantages of EMAS over customary RESA is that its predictable quiet properties as oppose to RESA which could be influenced significantly by adverse brave out conditions. EMAS has been designed not to be impacted by meteorological conditions. Furthermore, the slaying of an overrunning aircraft on a grassy RESA with distance of 240m is unpredictable, as the grass could be wet, muddy or frozen. As the results, even a recommended RESA at ridiculous weather condition might fail to accommodate an overrunning aircraft in case of which the properties of grounds surface have been compromised such that it will not support the weight of the aircraft.DH On May 25, 2008, a Kalitta Air B747-200 overran runway 20 of the capital of Belgium Airport, Belgium after a Rejected Take-Off. According to the final misfortune report by Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU), the aircraft came to stoppage 300m after the threshold where pilot escape slide was going down to railway bed. There were no fatalities however the aircraft was completely destroyed and humble down in three parts. Although runway 20 meets the ICAO minimum requirements but it does not conform to the ICAO recommendation as the extension of RESA is extremely costly. There will be a serious cost issue since runway 20 is geographically constraint due to the presence of the railway tracks on one end and existence of motorway from the other end.DH Moreover, AAIU have recommended Brussels Airport Authorities to consider installing EMAS to maximise the braking effect. Computational synopsis conducted by AAIU proves tha t in case of EMAS in placed within the RESA, the aircraft would have came to halt within the designated RESA and the level of harshness to the B747-200 would have been significantly minimised (AAIU, 2009).DH EMAS is a new technology and even in US, it was not until 2005 after FAA released Advisory Circle 5200.9 which finally found a policy on its application. According to Zodiac Aerospace, ICAO has started studying EMAS since early 2008 and moreover ICAO rewrites its annex every 7 years.DH From the essential research conducted it is found that EMAS manufacturing business will work voluntarily stop of charge with any airport worldwide to help them develop a introductory propose solution as well as estimating preliminary cost of installing EMAS at ends of their runways (Zodiac Aerospace, 2010). For instance it has already been done for 5 airports in India and 6 airports in Thailand free of charge.DH EMAS manufacturer states that it was not until 2006 that they entangle their product is appropriate and ready for international market, as they are producing third generation of EMAS. The previous(prenominal) generations ask high level of maintenance such that for the cases of airports in US which have deployed EMAS before 2006 require to resurface their EMAS bed every 3 to 5 years which could cost them between US $100,000 to US $300,000 (ESCO, 2010b) which is a significant drawback to ownership. Furthermore, EMAS manufacturer were not keen to enter international market prior to the introduction of the most recent generation EMASMAX where it does not have a maintenance intensive nature. EMASMAX bed eliminates large cost of ownership which encouraged Zodiac Aerospace to promote its product more confidently to international market.DH Today many airport mangers are reluctant to deploy EMAS within their RESA even though there are significant derive of evidence that supports the effectiveness of such proposal. Currently there are no acknowledgements made by ICAO to support airports which are suffering from lack of brusk safety margins at their RESA to consider EMAS as an approved and efficient substitute.DH EMAS recommends airports with runways having infair to middling RESA to benefit from EMAS as an alternative technology. In some countries transportation safety department recognise the effectiveness of such device, however regulator still remains to be reluctant and fails to acknowledge and respond to such proposal.DH In April 2008, Austrailian Civil Aviation synthetic rubber Administration (CASA) part 139 aerodrome standards were rewrite to permit an alternative Engineering solution to be deployed within RESA (CASA, 2009). They used engineering solution rather than EMAS since it would have appeared to be recommending a manufacturer rather than a safety concept. However, EMAS organisation is the only company approved by FAA to install EMAS beds.DH CASA has end the project of ensuring all of it air postman runways to meet ICA O requirements except runway 25 at Sydney Kingsford Smith International Airport (FSF, 2008). Although RESAs have been adopted for the other five runways fairly scarcely however runway 25 had been challenged by physical constrains to extend its RESA in order to meet ICAO requirement. Runway 25 abutted a major highway, airport perimeter road and a river which introduced heavy cost issues as the airport authorities decided to build a RESA above the obstructions. According to project manager Mr. Plummer (2010) the final cost of building the sixth and final RESA at Sydney airport was around $AU100 million which contradicts with published information on Sydney airport website that states Sydney Airports $AU100 million runway safety project is completed on the initiatory of April 2010 which cover the cost of extension of all six runways.DH In addition, tour the construction was being carried out, Airport authority opted to establish temporary RESA for runway 25 by reducing the take-off and landing distance on the 2529m runway by 97 meters (FSF, 2008). The criticisms still remain against Sydney airport authority as they failed to acknowledge the revised aerodrome standard made by CASA which in effect permitted airports to deploy an engineering solution to enhance their RESA safety margins. Having spent over $AU25 million just on the final sixth they still have not reaches ICAOs standard recommended practices, moreover, they could have install EMAS for another $AU6 million (EMAS, 2010).DH Having established that, from ICAOs point of view Sydney airport currently meets the standards, however, there is a olive-sized motivation for airport such as Sydney to endeavour to reach the ICAO recommended practice particularly if the airport is owned and operated by a profit dictated organisation. Moreover, in case of an overrun fortuity Sydney airport authority will not be in a position to defend themselves if they will asked on what basis they did not try to meet the reco mmended practice as they failed to deploy engineering solutions according to part-139 to mitigate risks and promote higher level of safety. Certainly it is beyond financial feasibility considerations as they could have invested a few more million dollars in installing EMAS which would driven their RESA safety standard more towards recommended practice than minimum requirement.The Australian Airports Association describe to the Air Transportation Safety Board that the Association does not view a safety case for extending RESAs beyond 90 m in length can be mounted or sustained (ATSB, 2009).DH Currently, ICAO is flavour into permitting arresting systems to be installed within runway RESA. In addition, ICAO is focusing to revise runway strip specifications, as of now, only objects allowed in runway strip are navigation assist provided that they are not hazards to operating aircraft. However, once the specifications are revised the outcome might allow navigational aids as well as ai rcraft safety systems in the runway strip. This rewrite will permit EMAS to be installed 11 meter from the runway end (EMAS, 2010). As DH suggests, The safety of the flying public and the credibility of our industry depends on making the right choices, and on implementing new technologies. We must choose wisely and we must always choose safety.SMSAccording to Morier (2005), the traditional approach to safety management was particularly concentrated on following certain required standards and react after the misadventures has taken place which blinded the authorities to see beyond the regulation. They failed to concentrate on how safety margin could be raise which is strongly adopted by SMS (Kikland, 2001). As SMS is adopted the mentality and the safety culture existed within the implemented aviation organisation has been significantly modify where management by oversight has been replaced by management insight (Leveson, 2004). In line with this, Kirkland (2001b) states that UK CAA has altered its safety regulation policy from enforcing rules into auditing and mitigating.Currently there are many aerodrome licensees around the world that fail adopt a SMS to minimise risks to reduce the likelihood of an overrun. A crucial driver in order to implement SMS in an aviation organisation is the general willing of the managers to improve the safety standards considering operational and economical efficiencies in case of adopting SMS (ICAO, 2006).SMS has a proactive nature which tends to solve and domesticate shortfalls prior to an disaster. SMS is efficaciously based on the misadventures and adventures reports as well as other perfunctory reports which encounter any unsafe area which could cause vulnerability to the system. once the area with certain level of risk is place, specific mitigating measures can be adopted according to the level of severity of the risk. Consequently, SMS enables an airport to appreciate its safety standards as it is more transp arent and clear to measure (ICAO, 2006).As SMS is a continuous cycle, it continues to be updated and improved once it is implemented within an organisation, therefore it gradually become a uniform process which starts with risk identification, followed by risk evaluation, implementing mitigation measures and finally monitoring their effectiveness in managing the identified risks (Mitchell, 2010).According to ICAO, SMS adopted by an airport is defined asA system for the management of safety at aerodromes including the organisational structure, responsibilities, processes and provisions for the implementation of aerodrome safety policies by an aerodrome operator, which provides for the control of safety at, and the safe use of, the aerodrome (ICAO 2002b).SMS ha s various advantages to the tradition approach. SMS is based on collecting and analysing relevant factors to monitor and manage risks. This method as it is based on quantitative as well qualitative evidences, avoid the previous influential human judgement. Another advantage of using SMS is it allows the organisation not only to identify yet to prioritise various challenges according to their level of severity (DOT, 2006).Once the SMS is adopted, the airport automatically becomes more practical in monitoring risks and implementing robust procedures to manage safety (CAA, 2003). Unfortunately, there are still cost issues which prevent an SMS to be adopted by many aviation organisations, particularly in third world countries. This is why the later stage of this report will focus on a cost synopsis of installing an engineering device within RESA of Mangalore Airport in India, in order to enhance the survivability of the passengers in a case of an overrun.Summaryof just SMS chasse accidents are not just about an adequate RESA or EMAS, in fact they are involved preciseness approaches, the ability to stabilise the approach for the pilot and landing on the touchdown zone at the right end of the runway. Moreover, ability to take the most appropriate exit for pilot darn having the freedom to taxi to terminal without undue pressure of having taken an exit.Overall, EMAS is a mitigator not a preventer (Eurocontrol, 2010). It must not be forgotten to invest on the ways which the overrun accident could have been prevented from happening. The very first step must be focused on tracking and identifying contributing factors and how effectively it can be managed to enhance safety margins. However, this thesis focuses on improving safety margins while minimising the severity level of damages post-overrun accident. .EMAS pecuniary FeasibilityThis part focuses to answer the final objective of this thesis which is to evaluate the financial feasibility of installing EMAS. To study this, a case study is proposed which is based on the most recent fatal overrun accident that occurred in India, Mangalore Airport, which killed 158 people onboard, on the 22nd of May 2010. Air India utter was operating B737-80 0 which overran the 2450m (8,033ft) runway number 06/24 (Hindustan Times, 2010). Financial calculation for installing EMAS will be structured according to FAA Order 5200.9 (FAA, 2005) however there are some assumptions and estimations in the calculation due to limited information received from Mangalore Airport.Mangalores overrunThe accident report is yet to be completed by Indias accident investigation unit, however according to Hepher (2010a), the aircraft landed long and over shot the runway and consequently ended up in a steep ravine at the end of the runway. As the aircraft was overrunning the end of the runway, it change the Instrument Landing System (ILS) localiser antenna which is an instrument to provide precision guidance to operating crew of an aircraft which is approaching and landing on a runway. Only the damaged caused to the ILS significant delays or cancelled number of feather which took Mangalores airport authority more than a month to return to their normal/sche duled operation.The Boeing 737-800 is counted and known as one of the most reliable and emulous aircraft in the current market which is operated by many airline all over the world. It current price in the market is between 66-75 million dollars (Hepher, 2010b). According to Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) (2010) Mangalore doss down is the worst accident involving 737-800 so far. In addition according to Ranganathan (2010), The Air India Express crash was waiting to happen.The current level of safety standards adopted in Indian civil aviation authority are significantly below the SARPs required by ICAO, particularly regarding the Aerodrome design. Even though there have some changes and amendments made in the regulation in order to rectify some of the issues but systematic rot is so deep (Gupta, 2010). fresh countrys robust growth promoted rapid growth and need for air travel. Indias international market for air travel has tripled between 2000 and 2008 (IATA, 2009) but its infrastr uctural safety margin are stretched beyond the recommended safe level by ICAO.Even though the runway 06/24 met the required RESA by ICAO and adequate runway length was provided for B737-800 to land but its adopted safety margins for its RESA did not allow any room for error in case of an overrun or veer-off. As previously mentioned, runway excursions make quarter of air transport accidents and incident (IFALPA, 2008) and yet there is still no unified standard for RESA and installation of safety areas where they are potentially needed to minimise the possibility of runway overruns.According to an anonymous Indian official involved in aviation, A disaster was waiting to happen and we have been very lucky to have had no major accidents in the past 10 years,. This is in line with Indias director of general civil aviation Mr. Gohain statement in April 2008 which reportedly said that India had just three inspectors for 10 commercial airlines and 600 planes. (worldaviationjournal, 2010). A ccording to ICAOs safety audit, India was listed as the worst country in terms of technical military group qualification and training(ICAO, 2006).The crash at Mangalore airport occur just about four after a similar fatal accident was prevented. The aircraft came to halt within designated safety area at Charleston Airport, (West Virginia), where the airport authority installed EMAS to enhance the level of survivability of their RESAs. Only after such disastrous event, Indian civil aviation authority decides to extend the runway 06/24 from 2450m to 2743m where as the result its RESA will extend too (Aviation Week, 2010). However, if there was an EMAS installed prior to the accident not only so many lives would have been saved but many unfavourable costs to airlines and airport would have avoided. Therefore coterminous section will focus on cost analysis of installing an EMAS at Mangalore airport. EMAS is one of the alternative ways which airport authorities could have adopted in ord er maximise the safety margins. Consequently, the level of severity of the crash could have been significantly reduced if not completely avoided. DP -Believes that if AAI had followed and adopted specific safety measures by studying the accident prophetical model which was developed by Wong (2007), they could have saved so many lived but they ignored such safety implementations.DP- The cost of an overrun accident can be more many time more than the cost of mitigating the risks but unfortunately, cost minimisation has been considered more important than safety maximation where airports decided to choose an option which offer lower margin error but it costs less.DP-Pitfield (2010) states in case where there is no adequate RESA is in place, airport authority should also consider closing the runway since there is no margin of an error unless the runway is long equal to extend the RESA without introducing operational limitations to the airport.DP- Even though the Pilots operated many time to that particular airport, Pitfield states that they are not the main people to be blamed. The most destructive factor is the some shortfalls of set out airport safety area regulations which are not uniformly monitored around the world. However the existing shortfalls in the present RESA regulation are gradually improved by introduction of Safety Management System (SMS) (Pitfield, 2010). However he still believes that there would be still institutional infrastructural constraints on implementing RESA from an aerodrome perspective.EMAS Installation Cost at Mangalore AirportThe financial feasibility is considered vital, since it is one the most effective alternative options for airports particularly facing geographical limitations, consequently they are constraints by terrains or obstacles to extend their RESA. There are number of ways to calculate EMAS installation cost, however the most recommended way is followed by a guideline produced by FAA Order 5200.9 and EMAS manufactu rer (Zodiac Aerospace). Airport Authority of India (AAI) agreed to provide the author up-to-date information regarding runway 06/24 to estimate the cost of installing an EMAS at both ends of the runway.In order to calculate the cost certain factors specific to the airport must be consideredEMAS must be capable of safely bringing a DESIGN/CRITICAL aircraft (which is in most cases the most frequent and heaviest aircraft that uses the runway) overrunning the threshold (end of runway) with a speed of 70 knots. The accident investigation unit has not yet reported the speed which B737-800 overran the end of runway at Mangalore airp